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Abstract: 
It is widely acknowledged that many renewable energy technologies cannot (yet) compete with 
incumbent (fossil fuel) options e.g. in terms of price. Transitions literature argues that sustainable 
innovations can nevertheless break out of their ‘niches’ if properly shielded, nurtured and 
empowered. Most studies using this perspective have focused on how innovation champions 
engage in shielding, nurturing and empowering (SNE) activities: none have so far focused 
specifically on the role that policy plays in relation to these three processes. This paper therefore 
aims to analyze the way in which policy constrains and enables the shielding, nurturing and 
empowering of renewable energy innovations. To do so, it presents a qualitative case study of the 
development of offshore wind power (OWP) in The Netherlands over the past four decades. Based 
on interpretation of a wide variety of written sources (academic histories, reports, policy 
documents, parliamentary debate transcripts, news media) and nine semi-structured interviews, it 
discerns six periods of relative stability in the history of Dutch offshore wind. It then analyzes the 
effects of various policies on the shielding, nurturing and empowering of offshore wind in these 
periods. The paper contributes to transitions literature (1) by providing an analysis of how policies 
can enable and constrain the shielding, nurturing and empowering of renewable energy 
innovations, and (2) by bringing together, for the first time, fragmented accounts of the 
surprisingly long history of Dutch offshore wind development and implementation. Both  
contributions are timely, given the recent reprioritization of OWP on the Dutch policy agenda. 
1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, offshore wind has proven to be a growth market. Having been considered 
a promising near-future energy source since the early 2000s [1] [2],  global installed capacity 
has increased from under 100 MW in 2001 to well over 6,500 MW by early 2014. A further 
3,000 MW is currently under construction and an additional 22,000 MW is consented [3]. 
Despite this significant growth, the majority of which has been realised in the UK [4], offshore 
turbines account for less than 2% of global wind power capacity [5] and its contribution to 
global electricity production remains marginal at around .04% [6]. Offshore wind has to 
compete with efficient, matured and cheaper incumbents solutions [7], and is not simply a 
diversification of onshore wind to a new segment [8]. It is relatively expensive compared even 
to other renewable energy sources, in part because of technological challenges like harsh and 
extreme installation and operation conditions and connection to electricity grids [9]. As such, 
the recent capacity growth has been facilitated by public support in the form of subsidies, tax 
breaks and other incentives. 
This was the case in The Netherlands as well, where two subsidised OWP farms were connected 
to the grid in 2007 and 2008, which made The Netherlands the third largest offshore wind 
country after ‘first mover’ Denmark and ‘early adopter’ The UK. The Netherlands appear to be in 
an ideal position to take advantage of this particular growth market, having a widely-known 
history of harnessing the power of wind; an international reputation for civil engineering in 
aquatic environments; substantial wind resources in a favourable part of the North Sea; an 
excellent infrastructure of sea ports experienced in facilitating offshore industries and 
providing access to Dutch exclusive economic zone; and ambitious climate change and 
sustainable energy goals (interviewees 3,4,7,9). The Netherlands also undertake pioneering 
research into offshore wind, and have several large firms that are highly active in the offshore 
sector internationally and have amassed experience especially in the development and 
construction segments of the offshore wind energy value chain (interviewees 1,2,6). 
Nevertheless, no further deployment has taken place since 2008 and The Netherlands was 
outpaced by both Belgium and Germany in 2012 (see: figure 1).  
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 Figure 1 clearly shows that since 2008, several countries in the North Sea Region have 
expanded their installed capacity, whereas this development has stagnated in The Netherlands. 
In their quantitative review of the European offshore wind energy innovation system, 
Wieczorek et al. [7] also find that Dutch offshore wind market formation is lacking compared to 
other nations, in spite of a strong knowledge base and world-renowned offshore contractors: 
“(…) Dutch constructors do belong to the group of international market leaders but, contrary to 
the German firms, they are not backed by the national government and a strong home market.” 
[7: 302]. Indeed, they point to a particular weakness in the Dutch offshore wind innovation 
system compared to that in other North Sea Region nations in terms of the current level of 
‘guidance’ offered by formal and informal institutions (e.g. governmental commitment, presence 
and reliability of policy goals and vision, expressed expectations, presence and quality of 
regulatory regimes, policy instruments and licensing procedures) [7: 301]. And indeed: while 
initially thought of in policy circles as promising, policy support for the relatively expensive 
offshore wind option was withdrawn from the Dutch renewable energy subsidy schemes in 
favour of cheaper options (interviewees 3,4,6). 
We agree with Wieczorek et al. that the fate of Dutch offshore wind seems to be tied strongly to 
the direction in which the policy winds are blowing. Recently, the government’s attitudes 
regarding offshore wind appear to have changed once again: in late 2012, the Dutch government 
increased its target for renewable energy generation in 2020 from 14% to 16% in 2023 [11] 
and acknowledged that this target can likely not be realized without a significant increase in the 
application of offshore wind energy [12]. Although the renewable energy target has decreased 
again since, the government’s ambition is currently to have 4,450 MW installed by 2023. This 
reprioritization of offshore wind on the Dutch policy agenda leads us to this paper’s main 
research question: how did policy enable and constrain the development of offshore wind in The 
Netherlands? No comprehensive review of Dutch offshore wind policy currently exists in 
literature: most policy reviews have so far focused mainly on the technology’s onshore 
application (e.g. [13],[14],[15],[16],[17]): offshore wind developments are either cursively 
discussed or omitted, e.g. on the argument that they “(…) are a different story altogether since 
wind energy offshore has met with very different challenges in its development and 
implementation” [15: p.18]. This paper therefore also aims to make a second contribution: 
providing a comprehensive, longitudinal review of Dutch offshore wind policy throughout the 
(perhaps surprisingly long) history of the technology’s development and implementation – an 
account so far lacking in literature.  
2. Conceptual framework 
Van de Ven distinguishes between two basic scientific models: variance models and a process 
models [18]. Variance models typically aim to establish statistically significant relations 
between dependent and independent variables, and explanations tend to take the shape of 
causal models that incorporate these variables (i.e. "X causes Y") [18]. Conversely, process 
models aim to give meaning to a specific sequence of events: they contextualize significant 
relations (i.e. “explain how it came to be that X causes Y”). This paper is underpinned by a 
process model. This does not mean that it is our goal to only describe the Dutch offshore wind 
policy history:  “(...) to describe a process, one needs event sequences. But to explain a process 
one needs to identify the generative structures that enable and constrain it [19: p.722]. To find 
such ‘generative structures, we turn to transitions literature. In this field, a conceptual 
framework has been developed to analyse the development of ‘infant’ sustainable innovations 
such as offshore wind. These innovations, which present sustainable alternatives to mainstream 
electricity generation options but are not (yet) technologically and/or economically 
competitive, are conceptualized as ‘niches’. Early work on niches primarily emphasized how 
innovations within these niches ought to be nurtured, focussing specifically on the articulation 
of expectations, the formation of networks, and the organization of learning processes 
[20],[21],[22]. More recently, the emphasis has broadened from what goes on within these 
protected spaces to (1) how these spaces are constituted, and (2) how they are removed or 
institutionalized. The former process is referred to as shielding (i.e. strategic work aimed at 
creating protected space by exempting an innovation from some mainstream selection 
environment), whereas the latter is referred to as empowering (i.e. strategic work aimed at the 
wider up-scaling of a niche). Several studies have confirmed the utility of analysing these three 
processes for understanding niche developments (e.g. [9],[23],[24],[25],[26]). 
Our paper uses this ‘shielding, nurturing, empowering’ framework as a basis for its ‘analytical 
chronology’ [27] of  how policy enabled and constrained the shielding, nurturing and 
empowering of offshore wind in The Netherlands. But although earlier studies stress the 
importance of policy in “constituting, supporting and disrupting” [23] protected spaces, none 
have specifically focused on the role of policy in these processes. We therefor propose the 
following adaptations to the framework (see: table 1): 
1. We propose that policy can enable, intentionally or not, the shielding of a sustainable 
innovation by enabling the emergence of a dedicated research community around a 
sustainable innovation (e.g. through basic research funding or targeted programs) or the 
realization of experiments, pilot projects, and demonstration projects (e.g. financial support, 
rule exemptions).  
2. We propose that policy can enable nurturing by contributing to e.g. the organization of 
learning processes within a niche, the formation of deep and heterogeneous networks, or 
the emergence of shared and specific expectations. And thirdly, policy can empower a 
sustainable innovation when it is either aimed at rendering such an innovation competitive 
under conventional criteria and has an explicitly temporary character (‘fit-and-conform’) or 
when it enables the institutionalization of sustainable values and/or beneficial institutional 
or infrastructural reforms (‘stretch-and-transform’). 
3. We propose that policy can constrain these developments by providing disincentives on 
these dimensions, or by withdrawing previous incentives. 
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The paper will test these propositions using a qualitative case study whose methodology is 
described in the following section. 
3. Methods and data 
We first compiled a timeline of key events around Dutch offshore wind power developments 
through desk research drawing on heterogeneous sources such as existing academic papers, 
histories of renewable energy sources, grey literature, trade press, stakeholder- and 
government reports, policy documents, parliamentary debate transcripts, and news articles. To 
confirm and complement the events on the resulting timeline, we subsequently did nine expert 
interviews [28]. The experts were strategically chosen for their knowledge of specific aspects of 
Dutch offshore wind developments, e.g. the energy sector, the offshore construction sector, 
policy developments, scientific research etc. (see: Table 1). We used a semi-structured interview 
method, which enabled us to tailor the interviews to the interviewees and explore new themes 
emerging from their responses [29]. The interview guide’s topics were: relevant actors, events, 
projects and policies. 
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Using the interview results, we transformed the aforementioned timeline into a more elaborate 
case history, in which we discerned six periods that are characterized by a degree of stability 
regarding some aspect of offshore wind energy development, e.g. in terms of the relevant policy 
regime, the actors involved, and/or the content of the debates around the technology. We then 
interpreted how the various policies (and the research programs, subsidy schemes, rules and 
regulations etc. than they resulted in) contributing to shielding, nurturing and empowering, by 
using the indicators listed in table 1. This periodization appears in section 4, along with tables 
containing aforementioned interpretation of policy effects on shielding, nurturing, empowering 
of offshore wind in the various periods. All translations are ours. Section 5 concludes and 
discusses. 
4. Dutch offshore wind policy history 
4.1 Early OWP research (1973 – 1985) 
The first Dutch study of the potential of OWP was made in 1973 by the Industrial Oceanography 
Council. The IRO had been established to promote the interests of the Dutch offshore industry in 
1971, some 10 years after drilling for gas on the North Sea had begun as a result of the 
discovery of large reserves of natural gas on Dutch soil in the late 1950s. The 1973 oil crisis 
raised awareness of the risks of dependence on foreign fossil fuels, which gave a boost to the 
offshore fossil fuel efforts that the IRO was primarily concerned with. It also triggered much 
discussion about alternatives to fossil fuels [13]. Although the government’s primary focus was 
on energy saving and nuclear power, renewable sources were discussed also, and one of these 
was wind energy. The IRO felt that wind energy at sea might possibly constitute an interesting 
future direction for Dutch offshore industry and, as it was its mission to explore such 
opportunities, it made a study of the economic and technical feasibility of what it referred to as 
“aero-generators at sea” in late 1973. A “Working Group Wind Energy” was established with 
representatives from the Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research TNO aircraft 
manufacturer Fokker, the electricity sector’s research institute KEMA, engineering agency 
Marcon, machine manufacturer VMF. It produced a report entitled Wind energy plants in the 
North Sea that concluded that offshore wind could contribute significantly to Dutch energy 
supply through the production of electricity and/or hydrogen [30]. It strongly advised more 
research into offshore wind energy, but stated that the construction of grid-connected offshore 
wind energy plants some 15 km. offshore was already technologically feasible. Its higher costs 
(compared to fossil fuel or nuclear power) were argued to be offset by the creation of new jobs 
and its potential as an export product. The report argued that the first offshore wind energy 
plant could be constructed by the mid-1980s: it envisioned the construction of fifty to a hundred 
10 MW turbines, of a triple-nacelle design similar to that suggested in 1972 in the USA [31] 
which would need to be interspaced by about 1 km [32]. Because of the large area required, “the 
North Sea emerges as the only realistic location for the large-scale application of wind energy 
plants.” Additional advantages of offshore placement were argued to be the lack of “visual 
hindrance or disruption of radio- and television reception” [30], which had been one of the 
problematic features of the 1960s experiments in retrofitting traditional windmills with 
electricity generators [13]. The engineering community took the idea seriously. For example, at 
a symposium held at Eindhoven Polytechnic (THE), TNO vice-chairman Boon referred to large-
scale offshore wind energy a “very real” option which, using “no more than half of the Dutch sea 
surface”, could generate the total Dutch energy demand many times over [33]. In July 1974, the 
IRO report was presented to the Ministries of Economic Affairs and Science Policy in July of 
1974 [34] and also made its way to the National Steering Group Energy Research (LSEO) [35]. 
The LSEO had been established earlier that year to evaluate options for the diversification of the 
Dutch energy supply and set up research programs based on these evaluations, and TNO vice-
chairmain Boon was one of its members. The LSEO’s 1975 interim report contained suggestions 
for research programs around various alternative energy sources, one being wind energy. In 
addition to arguing for an assessment of turbine designs, meteorological research, and a study 
of electricity transport issues in general, it also specifically called for an evaluation of the 
possibilities for offshore wind energy. The report proposed the construction of “(…) smaller 
production units (e.g. several dozen) using turbines on as of yet unspecified locations on the 
main land, as well as medium projects (Markerwaard, Waddenzee, Oosterschelde, IIsselmeer) 
and large projects (North Sea)” [36]. The proposed offshore siting of ‘medium’ and ‘large’ 
projects makes sense given the envisioned scale: if production units involving ‘several dozen’ 
turbines were defined as small, then - much like the 1974 IRO report had suggested - the 
inferred size of a large project effectively necessitated going offshore in a country as small and 
densely populated as the Netherlands. Upon the presentation of the report, a working group, 
whose members included the original IRO report’s main author, was tasked with transforming 
the LSEO report’s recommendations on wind energy in general into a coordinated national 
research program. Their advice, which included an assessment of offshore wind, was adopted 
by the LSEO, on whose advice the Ministry of Economic Affairs subsequently initiated the first 
National Research Program Wind Energy (NOW-1) in 1976. And so, while the rapid growth of 
North Sea oil- and gas exploitation shifted IRO’s focus away from offshore wind energy and 
towards these lucrative offshore activities in the second half of the 1970s [37], the advice 
contained in their wind report - a national research and development program - had been 
followed up. 
 Nevertheless, offshore wind was only a very small part of the NOW-1 program, whose general 
aim was to determine whether wind energy could significantly contribute to Dutch energy 
supply [13, p.142]: only some 2% of the program’s 19 million guilders (~22 million 2013€) 
budget went to offshore wind, compared to 80% of the budget for research into horizontal and 
vertical axis turbines, 6% for grid connection issues, and 5% for meteorological characterization 
[38]. The NOW-1 final report [39] was cautiously optimistic about wind energy in general, but 
less so about offshore wind: in spite of acknowledging offshore advantages in terms of 
availability of locations, lack of “horizon pollution” and noise nuisance and “minimal 
environmental risks”, the report deemed its costs, which it estimated at double those of 
realizing the same capacity on land, prohibitive. It argued that “(…) locating wind turbines at sea 
would deserve attention primarily if large-scale application on land should turn out to be 
impossible in terms of spatial planning policy” [39: p. 30]. NOW-1 was followed up by NOW-2 
(1981-1984) whose ‘O’ now stood for ‘ontwikkeling’ (development) instead of ‘onderzoek’ 
(research), signifying a shift from exploratory research to research aimed at concrete 
implementation [13: p.154-155]. Again, offshore wind was not the main focus: it was placed in 
the ‘miscellaneous’ category and again received some 2% of the now 37 million guilders (~32 
million €2013) budget. The offshore budget was used to make a contribution to the offshore 
component of the International Energy Agency (EIA)’s R&D Wind Energy Conversion Systems 
(WECS) program [38],[40]. This international program’s aims were to evaluate the economic 
feasibility of offshore wind and develop a plan for the joint design, construction and operation 
of a prototype. The Netherlands, through contracting partner the Dutch Energy Research Centre 
(ECN), was responsible for the conceptual design of an offshore wind energy conversion system 
[41], which by 1984 resulted in a plan for a 1 GW offshore wind energy plant [38]. 
Unsurprisingly, the project’s final report concluded that the costs of offshore wind energy were 
“somewhat above the present range of economic interest” but interestingly also stated that 
“[p]ublic reaction may force earlier consideration of offshore wind energy, particularly in 
Denmark and The Netherlands, both densely populated countries” [42]. 
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4.2 An offshore solution for an onshore problem (1986 – 1999) 
Over the 1980s, expectations about onshore wind had increased. The 1984 final report of a 
Broad Societal Discussion on Energy Policy (which had been prompted by a policy stalemate 
regarding expansion of the nuclear power program) had concluded that a goal of 2,500 MW 
onshore by the year 2000 was “ambitious but possible” [43: p.300]. In its 1985 response to the 
report, the government mitigated this expectation somewhat by stating that before 2000, a 
wind energy contribution in excess of 1,000 MW was not to be expected [13: p.153]. But in the 
second half of the 1980s, nuclear power gradually disappeared from the policy agenda following 
the Chernobyl disaster, and the idea of ‘sustainable development’ received a significant boost 
following the publication of the Brundtland-report Our Common Future. Discussions around this 
report led to the first National Environment Policy Plan NMP of 1989 aimed at preserving the 
carrying capacity of the environment to enable sustainable development [13]. 
When NOW-2 was succeeded by an Integral Wind Energy Program (IPW) the idea of ‘1,000 MW 
in the year 2000’ had evolved into a policy goal [13: p.150-154]. To policymakers, the goal 
seemed within reach: popular opinion about wind power was favourable, so they expected 
ample sites to become available without problems [44]. However, local resistance to wind 
farms, often framed in terms of visual hindrance and bird mortality, was far greater than 
expected. By the mid-1990s, only some 200 MW had been realized. At the time, policymakers 
attributed this to the so-called ‘not in my backyard syndrome’ (NIMBY), meaning the 
phenomenon that people are generally in favour of wind power unless it’s being implemented in 
their direct environment [44]. In reality, this attribution does not do justice to the motives of 
most opponents and downplays suboptimal policy choices that contributed to stagnating 
implementation, such as “aloofness” in the process of obtaining the requires sites [44], 
favouring large projects proposed by the energy sector over smaller decentralized ones, and a 
subsidy structure that focussed on installed capacity rather than electricity produced [13],[44].  
Nevertheless, policymakers believed ‘NIMBY’ was the main issue [33] and increasingly saw the 
siting of wind farms offshore as a possible way to circumvent it (interviewee 3). When IPW was 
succeeded by the Wind Energy Application Program (TWIN 1992-1995) [14: p.97], it 
specifically articulated a goal of 200 MW offshore capacity by 2010 [45: p.77]. The Noord-
Holland Province Electricity Company (PEN) was the first to make use of subsidies for offshore 
wind projects [46]. Expecting that offshore locations would have fewer objectors but also 
realizing that they would pose new challenges in terms of installation and maintenance as well 
as a higher costs [47], PEN wanted to gain knowledge and expertise early on. There was 
however no long-term strategy: “PEN didn’t have a clear-cut idea about how to proceed 
afterwards. The attitude was one of ‘let’s just do this, and we’ll see what we run into. Because it 
would be too complicated out at sea, they chose the IJsselmeer” (interviewee 3). This ~1100 
km2 artificial lake had been created in 1932 by the closing of the Zuiderzee bay. The 2 MW Lely 
project, some 0.8 km from the shore in 5-10 meters of water whose location was determined by 
military and heritage coast exclusion zones as well proximity to a harbour (interviewee 3), was 
constructed between 1992 and 1994 and became the world’s second offshore, grid-connected 
wind farm. Half of the parks costs were covered by TWIN and the IEA’s Centre for the Analysis 
and Dissemination of Demonstrated Energy Technologies (CADDET) [47],[48]. 
A year after the farm’s completion, the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ published its Third Energy 
Memorandum (1995), which increased the target for wind energy. It did not articulate specific 
goals for offshore wind energy, which it still referred to as “large-scale and very capital-
intensive” [49], but the aforementioned onshore implementation issues had made it was clear 
that the Memorandum’s goal of ’45 PJ of primary fuel savings in 2020’ could not be realized on 
land alone, as the maximum attainable onshore potential was thought to be around 1,500 MW 
[50]. Shortly after the Third Energy Memorandum, the TWIN program was followed by TWIN-2 
(1996-2000). Novem, the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ environmental agency, ordered a 
feasibility study into a 100 MW “Near Shore Park” as part of the program. At this point, it 
considered offshore locations to be the “most favourable in the long run” [51]. The feasibility 
study was conducted by ECN, Delft University of Technology, manufacturer Stork Energy, 
offshore company Heerema, engineering agency Fugro, the joint electricity producers 
organization SEP, and energy company ENW and focussed on current state-of-the-art turbines 
adapted to marine environments [45],[51]. The study was meant as a first step towards a pilot 
project which would be aimed at learning lessons for those future wind farms further offshore 
that were thought to be necessary to reach national targets [52]. The study concluded that a 100 
MW farm was technologically feasible and economically viable if supported through 
investment- and exploitation subsidies [53]. In 1997, the strategy to reach the Third Energy 
Memorandum’s general wind energy targets was laid out in the action programme Renewable 
Energy on the March. It translated the ‘45 PJ in 2020’ target to some 2,750 MW installed capacity 
[54] and reiterated that this would necessitate substantial offshore wind energy, although it did 
not expect large-scale construction until “well after 2000”. In 1998, environmental effect reports 
(MER) procedures were started for five possible locations for the demonstration park [55], 
taking into consideration aspects of safety, shipping lanes, landscape, and technical and 
economic feasibility [56]. In early 1999, Novem presented an ‘offshore wind energy placement 
plan’ which contained the results of a number of the aforementioned feasibility study1 and 
proposed to go ahead with the construction of the 100 MW demonstration park, which it 
thought could be operational in 2003 [55] and instrumental in “clearing the path for the 
construction of larger wind farms further out at sea” [58]. Later in 1999, the Minister of 
Economic Affairs announced a location 8-15 km off the coast of Egmond-aan-Zee This was a 
relatively near shore location within the 12-mile ‘territorial waters’ zone, which was thought to 
be a necessary first step for the development of parks further out to sea: experiences with this 
farm would be used to design effective policy for future parks. 
                                                             
1 One conclusion was that 3250 km2 of possible offshore wind locations was available in water less than 
20 m. deep and factoring in shipping routes, cables, pipelines and offshore resource mining [55], yielding 
a potential of between 4000 and 6000 MW [57]. 
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4.3 Urgency and optimism: towards two OWP farms (2000 – 2002) 
In late 1999, several private projects developers unexpectedly filed requests for permission to 
construct and operate offshore wind farms (interviewees 3,4,6,7,9). One of these was E-
connection, which had extensive experience in developing onshore wind. One of its multiple 
applications pertained to a location in ‘zone Q7’ outside the 12-mile zone. It had started 
developing the plan in 1998 in partnership with a German party that later withdrew 
(interviewee 6) and after the positive results of the aforementioned feasibility study into the 
experimental near-shore wind farm and the resulting broader awareness of the potential of 
offshore energy [48].  The choice was based in part on the low visibility from the shore at that 
distance, and less expected interference of migrating birds, both of which were though to 
decrease the chance of opposition by coastal communities (interviewee 3),[59]. The location 
would also necessitate the unprecedented placing of turbines in water depths > 20 meters. The 
required environmental impact assessment (MER) procedure was initiated in 2000. 
By that time, policy expectations around offshore wind had increased further. In late 2000, a 
Ministry of Economic Affairs study into long-term visions en energy supply created four 
possible futures: ‘free trade’, ‘isolation’, ‘great solidarity’ and ‘small-scale ecology’ [60]. In all 
four scenarios, wind power would play a role and in three (all except the last) offshore wind 
was assumed to have broken through [61]. Long-term thinking about energy systems was 
becoming increasingly popular with policymakers at the time: in its Fourth National 
Environmental plan (’NMP-4’), the government recognized the persistent nature of 
environmental problems, as well as the need for radical innovation and structural changes in 
the energy as well as the policy regime [62]. Such changes would not only require long-term 
policy commitment, but which could also not be expected to produce beneficial effects in the 
short run. This new policy paradigm was termed ‘transition policy’. The NMP-4 saw a 
“reasonable perspective” for offshore wind, especially when a “good location policy” were 
adopted [62: p.168]. One of its six scenarios for a transition to a sustainable energy supply in 
2030 included large-scale development of OWP (“100 to 150 farms equal in size to the planned 
Egmond-aan-Zee project”, [62: p.155]). 2001 also saw the liberalization of energy market for 
bulk users, while small-scale consumers were now allowed to choose their supplier only for 
‘green’ electricity. 
In 2001, a parliamentary consent concluded the planological core decision’ (PKB) planning 
process around Egmond-aan-Zee location for the government’s experimental park. It had been 
decided that from that point on, the park would have to be developed further by market parties 
and so a tender was issued for its construction and operation in 2001. A subsidy of €27 million 
was made available from the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ budget for CO2-reduction, but in 
return, proposals would have to include an extensive monitoring program of what came to be 
known as the Offshore Windpark Egmond aan Zee (OWEZ). Several consortia made a bid, and 
the concession was awarded to NoordzeeWind, a consortium between Shell and Nuon. In late 
2001, the other (Q7) farm’s MER report conclusions were accepted by the government. E-
connection’s initiative for the commercial exploitation of a park outside the 12-mile zone which 
was thought to be technically and economically feasible [58] raised some questions about the 
initial experimental farm’s near-shore location, but the government saw no reason to reconsider 
Egmond-aan-Zee [56]. The licence for Q7 was granted in early 2002 [63] and later that year the 
government announced that the two consented offshore wind farms would be eligible for two 
pre-existing fiscal instruments aimed at stimulating environmentally-friendly investments: the 
discretionary depreciation mechanism VAMIL and energy investment tax credit EIA [64]. 
The idea had been that a policy for offshore wind would be drafted based on experiences with 
the explicitly experimental first farm, but now E-connection had unexpectedly filed (and 
eventually been granted) an application to construct an additional park at a time when 
policymakers had not expected interest by the market: the private sector had caught up with the 
government [65]. No specific legislation for the licencing of offshore wind energy yet existed. In 
response to this “completely unclear legal situation” (interviewee 6), the government simply 
“taped the mailbox shut” (interviewee 14). Additional OWP farm location applications by 
developers Nuon, Evelop, Greenpeace and E-connection (interviewee 6) were then faced with a 
moratorium on applications for licences in 2001, pending an institutional reform that would 
empower the broader roll-out of OWP: the design of a system of permits for construction of 
farms [66],[67],[68]. The applicants formally objected, but also joined forces to regularly talk to 
the government about what such a system should like, in an attempt to “convert the running 
lawsuits into something more constructive” (interviewee 6). 
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4.4 Licencing troubles and controversies (2003 – 2006) 
The new licencing policy that the government had announced at the time of the 2001 
moratorium was proposed to a concession system (after the Danish example), whereby 
strategic zones would be designated by the government, within which interested parties could 
request a concession which would be a requirement for a licence to construct under the Wbr 
(i.e. somewhat similar to the OWEZ farm’s process). Smaller developers argued against such a 
concession system, believing that it favoured ‘big players’ over newcomers (interviewee 6,9) 
and favouring handing our licenses under current legislation (i.e. similar to the Q7 farm’s 
process). For example, project developer Evelop argued that under the government’s proposed 
concession system, “[y]ou’ll only get a licence if you can demonstrate with certainly that you can 
build the park. This drives independent developers out of the market. Only big players like Shell 
and Nuon can give such guarantees” [69]. However, the promised concession system took 
longer to materialize than the would-be developers desired. Greenpeace attributed this to the 
fact that the process involved multiple ministries (notably the Ministry of Economic Affairs,  
which was responsible for energy policy, and the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management which was responsible for activities in the Dutch EEZ’s seabed), and to a general a 
low “sense of urgency” around climate change by the government [67],[70]. Indeed, the center-
right coalition (CDA/VVD/LPF) which had come to power in mid-2002 had cut down severely 
on renewable energy subsidies [71] and this impacted the future of offshore wind as well: 
whereas the previous Minister of Economic Affairs had called the realization of a “generation 
capacity of 6000 MW at sea” by “2020 at the latest” both “possible” and “necessary for urgent 
reasons of great public gravity” [72], the new one was less optimistic and commissioned a 
societal cost-benefit analysis of offshore wind by the Central Planning Agency (CPB). In the 
subsequent center-right coalition (CDA/VVD/D66) that came to power in 2003, renewable 
energy wasn’t a key issue, either: the Minister of VROM delegated the topic of climate policy to 
her Secretary of State who did not succeed it making it a priority [71] while the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs’s energy policy efforts were primarily focused on the full liberalization of the 
energy market in 2004, and on redesigning the failed sustainable energy demand subsidy (REB) 
scheme (which had resulted in large sums of tax income leaking to foreign nations) into a new 
open-ended production subsidy [71]. This Electricity Production Environmental Quality scheme 
(MEP) came into effect in 2004 and granted, for a period of 10 years, a guaranteed subsidy per 
kWh to producers of renewable energy (interviewee 6). It was crucial for the OWEZ and Q7 
farms: subsidizing the ‘uneconomic premium’ on the production of renewable energy would 
make the offshore wind parks owners’ income a combination of this kWh subsidy (MEP) and the 
electricity sold under a power purchase agreement (PPA). MEP subsidy was applied for by and - 
eventually - granted to both parks. 
While the government was working towards designing a concession system, market parties and 
research institutes were working towards generating the required expertise and knowledge for 
reaching the 6,000 MW in 2020 target. To this end, some 30 parties from the energy sector (e.g. 
Nuon, Eneco, Delta, Tennet), the offshore industry (e.g. Ballast Nedam, Fugro), wind farm 
developers (e.g. Shell, Siemens) research institutes (e.g ECN, TU Delft), and NGO’s (e.g. including 
Greenpeace, Stichting De Noordzee), had formed a consortium called ‘We@Sea’ around 2003 
[73] and in 2004 received funding for a research project aimed at applying experiences with the 
OWEZ wind farm to future ones (interviewee 6). 
At that point, the government presented a proposal for concession system for these future parks 
but it was overruled by the Council of State, in part on the grounds that it felt that the 
argumentation for the chosen zones was insufficient (interviewee 6,9). Small independent 
developers, who had been against the concession system in the first place, as well as Greenpeace 
argued that it would be a mistake to go back to the drawing board: the continued absence of a 
licence policy was scaring off potential developers and investors (e.g. Evelop acquired a licence 
for an OWP farm in the UK [69]). They argued it would result in a stagnation of offshore wind 
deployment after the commissioning of the two consented parks [67],[70],[74]. Several 
members of parliaments argued for moving quickly so as not to completely lose momentum and 
give market parties the chance to apply for licenses based on current policy instead [75]. For 
example, Samsom (Labour, opposition) called on the Minister to “(…) forget about the 
concession system, [because] on the basis of current legislation it is already possible to hand out 
licences with which investors and developers can get to work immediately” [76]. In mid-2004, 
Minister of Economic Affairs Brinkhorst (D66) announced to be open to this option [75], even 
though Liberal (VVD) and Christian Democrat (CDA) members of parliament were already 
arguing for pulling the plug on the ‘6,000 MW in 2020’ goal, reasoning that offshore wind was 
too expensive an option for realizing its European renewable energy target [74], Brinkhorst 
took a middle road: he claimed to favour offshore wind energy deployment proceeding in a 
phased, financially controlled fashion that left the possibility of not realizing the 6GW goal: 
“should the necessary cost reduction not materialize, we can shut off the money stream on time” 
[77]. 
Feeling that market parties would be willing to compete with one another for prime locations 
[65] and knowing that it was not allowed to string along would-be developers much longer 
(interviewee 6), the government lifted the moratorium in late 2004 and announced that 
licencing would take place on a first come first served (FCFS) basis: whichever party managed 
to complete an application (which needed to include an environmental effect report) for a given 
location the first, would get the licence. Subsequently, the Ministry of Economic Affairs made 
available the aforementioned open-ended production subsidy (MEP). Interest was far greater 
than expected, however: already in the first months of 2005, some 60-70 applications were 
filed, many for overlapping (i.e. the cheapest) locations. The process was heavily criticized, and 
has been characterized by many involved parties as highly inefficient, due to e.g. wasted 
research resources on overlapping environmental effect scans for applications which were not 
granted (interviewee 4,6,7). The Department of Public Works (Rijkswaterstaat), the Ministry of 
V&W’s executive agency responsible for managing the Dutch sea bed and consequently the 
licencing procedure, became overloaded (interviewee 7). As a result, the government 
temporarily closed the licence application process already in mid-2005 [78] and also cancelled 
the MEP production subsidy scheme for offshore wind and biomass, stating as a reason that 
costs would run out of control due to the unexpectedly high number of applications: it was too 
successful and therefore too expensive [79]. Later that year, the results of the societal cost-
benefit analysis of offshore wind by the Central Planning Agency (CPB) which the previous 
Minister of Economic Affairs had ordered in 2002 were published. It concluded that investing in 
offshore wind in the short term would not be ‘societally profitable’. In response, the Minister of 
Economic Affairs stated that the report confirmed his choice of his temporary freezing subsidies 
as well as his phased deployment strategy, but political parties VVD (liberals) and CDA 
(Christian Democrats) called for a definitive end to the subsidization of offshore wind [80],[81]. 
The CBP report’s conclusion were called into question by offshore wind proponents, however, 
who argued that its outcomes were heavily dependent on questionable assumptions about e.g. 
learning effects, future oil prices and CO2-emission prices [82]. 
Contestation also haunted the licensing system. The Dutch Wind Energy Association NWEA, a 
branch organization composed of wind sector actors to lobby for their interests, still favoured a 
first come first served licencing (FCFS) process at least for the subsequent ‘Round 2’ of licencing 
(interviewee 6). Others argued that the FCFS process was only suitable for more mature and 
stable industries [83],[84] and called for the licencing system to be redesigned immediately. For 
example, environmental organizations argued that “(…) offshore wind is no business for the free 
market. Wind farms require financial support and careful special planning. This is a 
government’s task: it should stimulate offshore wind in a predictable fashion and take charge of 
the locations of wind farms” [85: p.6]. When the moratorium was lifted again in early 2006, the 
licencing process was still first-come-first-served. The Minister of Economic Affairs did however 
promise to redesign both the licencing- and subsidy procedures in dialogue with the offshore 
wind sector [78]. But instead, in mid-2006, the Minister of Economic Affairs unexpectedly and 
unilaterally terminated the subsidy scheme altogether, arguing that The Netherlands were on 
course for realizing the ‘9% renewables in 2010’ goal and so no further subsidy was needed. 
The government admitted that the subsidy scheme’s design had been flawed: projects meeting 
the criteria could not be refused and were awarded a guaranteed production subsidy based on a 
price expectation, but because price levels fluctuated, costs increased dramatically and the 
budget was exceeded [71]. In its stead, the government now desired a new and less out-of-
control subsidy scheme based on tenders and budgets per sector ([86], interviewee 4). The 
NWEA called the government “unreliable” in response, blamed the Minister for not having 
consulted with the sector as promised [87], and started lobbying for a redesigned MEP based on 
a feed-in tariff [88]. Around the same time, the OWEZ farm began supplying electricity to the 
grid. Plagued by licencing issues, construction had only begun in late 2005. The farm had been 
built by the Egmond Building Corporation:  a joint venture between turbine manufacturer 
Vestas and contractor Ballast Nedam that had previously constructed the Lely farm (interviewee 
3). On the occasion of its opening, We@Sea proclaimed this “first North Sea wind park” to be 
“more important than the first man on the moon” [89]. 
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4.5 Towards a second round of rollout (2007 – 2009) 
After parliamentary elections in late 2006, a center-left coalition (CDA, CU, PvdA) came to 
power in early 2007. Although sustainability had not played a major role in the election 
campaigns, the theme received an unexpectedly prominent place in the coalition agreement, 
which some attributed to the peaking public attention to climate change [71],[90]. It articulated 
highly ambitious goals for 2020 (30% CO2 reduction, 20% energy savings in 2020, 20% 
renewable energy), although it did not go into the specifics of how these should be achieved. 
NWEA reacted enthusiastically to the coalition agreement and lobbied for offshore wind as a 
way to realize the agreement’s ambitious goals. It called for swift decisions on Round 2 of OWP 
deployment, as well as a more strategic location study for a future Round 3, because considering 
other North Sea stakeholders in such a process was argued to speed up deployment [91]. NWEA 
was also consulted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs about design of the production subsidy 
successor to the failed MEP scheme [92],[93],[94]. In late 2007, the government published its 
strategy for realizing its coalition agreement. It announced a new, capped, production subsidy 
system (SDE), which, it promised, would be used also to stimulate offshore wind deployment.  It 
committed to 450 MW of offshore capacity in Round 2, to be allocated through an SDE tender 
among parties that would have acquired a license, as well as a solution to the issues around the 
licencing system for Round 3, by the end of its period in office in 2011. 
In 2007, several such licence applications were denied by Rijkswaterstaat (RWS) [95], leading 
Lower House member Samsom (PvdA) to ask questions in parliament about a supposed 
categorical denial of applications, but the Ministers of V&W and Economic Affairs denied the 
allegation and argued that the new criteria were based on progressive insights about shipping 
safety stemming from the shipping sector’s experience with the two Round 1 wind farms [96]. 
In part to prevent such future conflicts of interest with the nautical sector, NWEA continued to 
lobby for a strategic and collective location policy involving all potential stakeholders, using the 
British system as an example, for the future Round 3, while still favouring the current system for 
the upcoming Round 2 [97].  
And indeed, in April 2008 the government announced that as a part of a new National Water 
Plan it would allocate offshore wind energy areas where the remainder of the ‘6000 MW in 
2020’ goal could be realized. This was meant to give a “steering role to the [next] cabinets that 
need to realize the 2020 target” [98]. In its mid-2008 Energy Report the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs reiterated its promise to provide a clear vision on the future uses of the North Sea and a 
coordinated approach to spatial planning, licenses and stimulation through SDE. It also 
reiterated the long-term ‘6000 MW in 2020’ goal and explicitly framed the North Sea as an 
energy source [99]. A late-2008 draft version of the National Water Plan appointed two large 
areas for Round 3 of Dutch development which would take place between 2015 and 2020: 
IJmuiden-Ver (a ~1170 km2 area where it was thought some 5000 MW could be realized) and 
Borssele (344 km2, 1000 MW), as well as ‘search areas’ for further Round 3 development. 
Around that time, the second and final Round 1 OWP farm began supplying electricity to the 
grid, on which occasion it was officially renamed ‘Princess Amalia’. Its construction had been 
delayed by E-connection’s initial trouble finding investors, but after it had transferred its rights 
to construct and exploit the Q7 farm to investors energy company Eneco and renewable energy 
company Econcern in mid-2006 and reached financial close in late 2006, construction had 
commenced in the hands of Danish companies Vestas (turbine supply) and A2SEA (turbine 
installation), and Dutch companies Smulders (monopile construction) and marine contractor 
Van Oord (foundation installation and cable laying) ([59], interviewee 1). 
In early 2009, the to-be-subsidized (through SDE) capacity for Round 2 was increased from 450 
MW to 950 MW as part of an economic stimulus package (‘groene stimuleringspakket’) to 
combat the economic crisis ([100]; interviewee 4). The total amount made available for the 950 
MW tender was €4.5 billion, to be paid as a production subsidy over a period of 15 years. This 
number was based on an ECN estimate of 16-19 cents/kWh by ECN [101]. An SDE subsidy 
tender was opened to realize this 950 MW capacity: parties that at the time of the tender would 
have acquired a licence for an OWP farm could compete on kWh price (with a correction factor 
for distance to the shore). 
A few months later, Minister of Economic Affairs Van der Hoeven wrote a remarkable opinion 
piece in national newspaper de Volkskrant, which seemed to contradict her recent policy choices 
by stating that “for the next few years, renewable energy is a too limited and too expensive 
option for CO2-reduction” and that CO2 mitigation “shouldn’t come first in renewable energy 
policy”. Believing that the economic crisis necessitated an “economic approach to renewable 
energy”, she argued for an end to the indefinite subsidizing of the market price / cost price 
difference which “makes companies lazy”. Instead, she argued for a focus on European (versus 
national) targets to stop the “subsidy war between member states” whereby multinationals 
build wind farms wherever subsidy is the highest. She also argued for creating “green jobs” and 
stimulating innovation in those sectors where The Netherlands could have a competitive 
advantage, such as offshore wind where, she argued, subsidies would likely be inevitable for a 
while but should end by the end of the next Cabinet’s period in office [102]. A month later, the 
Minister established a ‘Taskforce Offshore Wind Energy’ to advise on the optimal way of 
involving the private sector in achieving the policy goal of 6000 MW in 2020 [103]. In response, 
a new consortium of 10 actors from industry and reseach (RWE, Eneco, TenneT, Ballast Nedam, 
Van Oord, IHC Merwede, 2-B Energy, XEMC Darwind, ECN and TU Delft), many of whom had 
partaken in the We@Sea consortium, presented a joint initiative called Far and Large Offshore 
Wind (FLOW) which was aimed at R&D into innovative turbines, foundations, and installation- 
and maintenance methods aimed at future wind farms farther out in the North Sea ([104], 
interviewee 6). 
In September 2009, the Ministers of Economic Affairs, V&W and VROM, jointly published their 
‘National Water Plan’ (NWP) 2009-2015, which laid out the key points of the nation’s water 
policy. They also announced that for the future Round 3 they had opted for a concession system: 
within the aforementioned wind energy areas, large enough in principle to accommodate 6000 
MW, it could give exclusive permission to market parties to develop OWP parks and within 
which it could deny non-OWP projects. It could also deny applications to construct OWP parks 
outside these areas, which was meant to prevent conflicts with other North Sea users. Moreover, 
in the new concession system, spatial planning would be coupled to financing unlike in Round 2, 
where one first had to acquire spatial planning license and could then compete for SDE subsidy 
[105].  
Meanwhile, the parties who would compete in this Round 2 SDE tender were coming into focus. 
Of the dozens of licence applications submitted by that time, twelve had been granted by the 
Ministry of V&W: the rest had been rejected mostly due to proximity to shipping lanes, drilling 
platforms, helicopter routes, offshore sand mining, and bird colonies [106]. The majority of the 
participants in the tender were foreign parties, notably German (4 parks RWE and Bard 
Gruppe), and Irish (3 parks, Airtricity) (Irish), RWE (German). In early 2010, the winners were 
announced to be two subsidiaries of German wind farm developer Bard Gruppe, who had 
proposed three (and had been granted subsidy for two) adjacent 300 MW parks north of the isle 
of Schiermonnikoog. They had beaten some of the large names (e.g. Eneco, Nuon/Vattenfall, 
Essent/RWE) on the key criterion of price: because Bard Gruppe already had a German OWP 
farm close to the proposed location, estimated maintenance costs were relatively low [107] (In 
2011, Dutch project developer Typhoon would acquired the licence and SDE commitment from 
the financially struggling Bard Gruppe). It was now clear that the allocated budget would be 
insufficient to realize the desired 950 MW [108]. The remaining budget of approx. €1 billion 
would be allocated in late 2011 to a different, smaller (129 MW) configuration of Eneco’s 
application in the Q10 plot (interviewee 4,7) which was renamed ‘Luchterduinen’. 
But around the time of the announcement of the SDE winners, the center-left cabinet fell: it was 
succeeded in late 2010 by a more conservative, center-right minority coalition between the 
economic liberal parties VVD and CDA. New Prime Minister Rutte (VVD) had set the tone for his 
party’s take on wind energy during the elections by famously stating that “windmills don’t ‘run 
on wind, but on subsidies”. Soon after his appointment, the new Minister of ELI (Verhagen) 
drastically altered the SDE production subsidy scheme. In the resulting SDE+ scheme, instead of 
differentiated cost-of-production estimates for different renewable sources, a single amount 
was set for all renewables. Additionally, subsidies for offshore wind (along with small-scale 
solar PV) were terminated altogether. Verhagen stated that “[w]here the previous SDE focused 
on two goals, roll-out and innovation, I want to focus SDE+ on an efficient roll-out to make 
headway in achieving the target of 14% renewable electricity in 2020” [109]. Offshore wind had 
no place in this, as it was too expensive to compete (interviewee 4, 6): “SDE+ is not a beneficial 
system for offshore wind, which is outcompeted by cheaper alternatives” (interviewee 4). 
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4.6 Offshore wind as a top sector (2010 – 2013) 
The way of thinking articulated in Van der Hoeven’s 2009 opinion piece, in which sustainable 
energy would have to fit with existing economic criteria, would come to exemplify the new 
cabinet’s policy. Sustainability was considered subordinate to economic policy, and would have 
to be realized through innovation, not (or at least to a lesser extent) through subsidy. As a focus 
area, ‘innovation’ now fell under the Ministry of Economic Affairs even in name: it had merged 
into the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation. The ‘transition policy’ 
paradigm of the early 2000s now gave way to the concept of a ‘top sector policy’ [71], in which 
the government aimed to stimulate cooperation between industry, research and policy for nine 
innovative sectors in which The Netherlands excelled internationally. The initiative would lie 
primarily with market parties: the government would adopt a more facilitating role than it had 
before.  
Consistent with this new paradigm, the government made dozens of ‘green deals’ (mostly 
relating to energy) with private sector and societal organizations with the aim of “making 
sustainability more economic” [110]. Specifically not a subsidy instrument, the green deals were 
aimed at bringing parties together, providing knowledge, and “removing policy barriers”. The 
initiative would lie with private sector parties, who were required to show that their initiative 
would result in new economic activity and/or cost reductions. One such initiative was the 
‘Green Deal Offshore Wind’, which was made in late 2011 between the government and wind 
sector representative NWEA (interviewee 6). Its main goal was a 40% reduction in the cost of 
offshore wind by 2020 – a cost reduction was which now seen as a precondition for the large-
scale roll-out of offshore wind. The press announcement focused strongly on the Dutch offshore 
wind sectors job potential (from a current total 2,200 to 11,000 in 2020 if a home market could 
be developed), the “exceptionally favourable conditions of the Dutch part of the North Sea”, and 
the sector’s previous involvement in the construction of (all) North Sea OWP parks. Some 50 
parties (including FLOW) signed up, and the green deal was symbolically announced as “the 
birth of the Dutch offshore wind sector” at the European Wind Energy Association (EWEA)’s 
OFFSHORE 2011 trade show in Amsterdam (interviewee 6). 
One of the sectors in the new government’s top sector policy was energy, and offshore wind was 
designated as one of seven key areas in this sector. A key role in the new top sector policy would 
be for so-called Top Consortia for Knowledge and Innovation (TKI’s): partnerships between 
market parties and knowledge institutes for research that should lead to economically viable 
solutions to societal problems. The industry and research-led FLOW initiative fit perfectly in the 
new policy paradigm [111] and in early 2012, it accepted the government’s invitation to act as 
TKI for offshore wind and issued a tender for projects (interviewee 6). 
In addition to the green deals, so-called ‘innovation contracts’ were drafted for each the top 
sectors as part of the top sector policy (interviewee 6). These innovation contracts contained 
measures, plans and agreements to strengthen the sectors in the near future. An Offshore Wind 
Innovation Contract was signed in early 2012. It aimed at a 6 billion EUR offshore wind sector 
revenue in 2020, and argued that this could only be achieved through innovation aimed at cost 
reduction, application of such innovations in a demonstration park, and a subsequent roll-out 
[112], which was envisioned to take place from 2016/2017 onward and achieve over 5000 MW 
in 2020. The contract further stated that a perspective on a home market would be essential for 
industry commitment, and that “the question was not if offshore wind would take off, but if The 
Netherlands can maintain its leading position”. In late 2012, the OWEZ monitoring program’s 
results were presented at an Offshore Wind and Ecology Congress: it concluded that the park 
had had next to no adverse consequences for birds, fish and other marine life, and in fact had 
significant positive effects, such as on cod and harbour porpoises which are drawn to the 
abundance of sustenance in the wind park (where fishing is not allowed). 
Rutte’s cabinet fell in April 2012, and the September 2012 parliamentary elections were won by 
conservative liberal VVD and labour PvdA. NWEA lobbied for offshore wind during the parties’ 
coalition agreement negotiations [113]. The resulting coalition agreement referred to OWP as a 
“promising sector” and pledged to support energy sector- and OWP industry initiatives to 
stimulate innovation to “bring down the cost price of OWP at an increased rate”.  
Simultaneously, it increased the 2020 sustainable energy target from 14% to 16% (VVD and 
PvdA, 2013). Many felt that this target could not be realized without OWP and by mid-2013, the 
new (VVD) Minister of Economic Affairs agreed: he referred to OWP as indispensable for 
realizing 16% renewables in 2020 and announced his willingness to earmark part of the SDE+ 
budget specifically for OWP. Although he referred his own suggestion as “unelegant” and “ not in 
the spirit of the SDE system” which has been designed to favour the least expensive renewable 
energy options, he argued that the “low-hanging fruit” options would eventually deplete the 
budget but not realize the target, leaving nothing for OWP at the point when it would be ready 
(i.e. cheap enough) to make its contribution to the target [12]: “if we want to realize 16%, then 
the more expensive options have to be on the table again, as well” (interviewee 6). In addition to 
the search for additional wind energy areas promised in the 2009 National Water Plan (and 
which had focused on two large areas of west of the Province of Noord-Holland and north of the 
Wadden islands) that would result in a new 2014 offshore wind strategic structure agenda 
(‘structuurvisie wind op zee’), the government now also ordered a feasibility study for OWP 
construction within the 12-mile zone, arguing that it wanted to explore all options to meet the 
‘16% in 2020 target’ and reasoning that OWP is cheaper when constructed nearer to the shore. 
According to some, this study is mostly a “trial balloon aimed at seeing how coastal 
municipalities and citizens react” (interviewee 7). A major 2013 national energy agreement set 
the 2020 target back to 14% again, but it did add a specific offshore wind goal of 4450 MW in 
2023 [114].  
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5. Conclusions & discussion 
This paper has made two main contributions: (1) bringing together and adding to the 
fragmented academic literature on offshore wind policy in The Netherlands by providing a 
comprehensive chronological review of four decades of Dutch offshore wind developments in 
six periods of relative stability, and (2) analyzing the effects of various policies in these periods 
on the shielding, nurturing and empowering of offshore wind in these periods. 
Regarding the first main contribution, the six periods are: 
1. The first period (1973-1985) is characterized by the emergence of the idea of OWP among 
engineering- and policy communities. OWP began as a possible diversification option as a 
response to the 1972 oil crisis. Given the dominance of  ‘large scale thinking’ about energy 
systems, offshore placement was considered and researched, but dismissed as being 
prohibitively expensive compared to onshore wind in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, 
minor policy support took the form of small parts of consecutive renewable energy research 
funding programs’ budgets (to research into offshore wind energy as a long-term option). 
2. The second period (1986-1999) is characterized by policymakers increasingly coming to see 
the offshore siting of wind turbines as a possible solution for the problematic realization of 
their onshore wind targets due to societal opposition. Funds were made available, which 
resulted in a small offshore wind experiment by an energy company, and a study into a 
larger farm was commissioned, which resulted in the policy decision to construct (and 
partially fund) an experimental 100 MW farm in the North Sea. 
3. The third period (2000-2002) is characterized by the emergence of the ‘transition policy’ 
paradigm in general, and a further increase in policymakers’ expectations around offshore 
wind in particular. This resulted in the ambitious policy goal of 6,000 MW in 2020 and by 
the search for a market party to construct the first large Dutch experimental offshore wind 
park. It is further characterized by the private sector taking an unexpected interest in 
offshore wind energy at a time when no policy was yet present, which resulted in an ad-hoc 
‘solution’ in the form of moratorium on license applications.   
4. The fourth period (2003-2006) is characterized by contestation in a context of consecutive 
governments for whom climate change and renewable energy were not priorities: 
contestation around the various licenses required for the two consented OWP farms; 
contestation over the optimal licensing procedure for future ones; and finally, contestation 
over the legitimacy of government subsidization of what in this period is increasingly 
framed as a too expensive option for realizing the Dutch renewable energy targets. One 
characteristic result of these contestations in this period is increased collaboration among 
actors in the Dutch offshore wind energy sector. Towards the end of the period, the 2001 
moratorium is briefly lifted but quickly reinstated, and it concludes with the withdrawal of 
subsidy for OWP. 
5. The fifth period (2007-2009) is characterized by a renewed impulse for OWP. In the context 
of increased societal attention to climate change, a new (center-left) cabinet sees OWP as a 
climate change solution. The moratorium is lifted once again, and while the government 
evaluates applications, it announces a subsidy tender for what is now referred to as ‘Round 
2’ of OWP deployment and promises a concession system for the future ‘Round 3’. But after 
the two ‘Round 1’ farms come online, the subsidy is granted, and the concession system laid 
down in a new national water policy, the cabinet is replaced by a more center-right one 
which substantially revises renewable energy subsidy system and eliminates OWP from it. 
6. The sixth period (2010-2013) is characterized by a shift in policy support for OWP from 
deployment to cost-reduction through innovation in the context of the new cabinet’s ‘top 
sector’ policy paradigm: stimulating industry-research-policy cooperation by adopting a 
facilitating role in supporting initiatives by market parties. OWP is named a ‘key area’ in the 
‘top sector energy’ in part because of its job potential and is supported through a ‘green 
deal’ and an ‘innovation contract’. The OWP sector’s focus is now significant cost reduction, 
which was made a prerequisite for (financial) government support for further deployment 
in a future ‘Round 3’. 
We acknowledge that this periodization is a descriptive abstraction that we superimpose on 
historical events [115]. Nevertheless, we argue that the periodization we constructed helps to 
signify and understand the role of policy in Dutch offshore wind development, because the 
periods represent blocks of time within which certain characteristics of Dutch offshore wind 
development were relatively stable: either specific contextual developments (such as changing 
political landscapes and the shifting prominence of climate change), or offshore wind-related 
developments (such as changing expectations regarding OWP and changing OWP policies), or 
actor configurations (such as the types of actors interested in OWP). Additionally, while the fact 
that our periods become shorter over time may seem to suggest ‘temporal discounting’ or 
‘present bias’, we argue that this is rather the result of offshore wind developments having 
objectively intensified over the period under study (e.g. increasing media coverage, increasing 
numbers of actors involved, increasing parliamentary debates on OWP, increasing global 
deployment etc.).  
As to the second main contribution, we specifically investigated the relation between policy and 
the shielding, nurturing and empowering of offshore wind in these periods. The following four 
conclusions therefor provide an answer to our research question about how policy has enabled 
and constrained the development of offshore wind in The Netherlands.  
1. Previous studies using the S/N/E framework have analyzed the three processes from the 
perspective of innovation advocates. In practice, this has meant examining the work done by 
these actors to (attempt to) shield, nurture and empower their innovation of choice. We 
found that in relation to policy, such work by innovation champions prominently includes 
lobbying activities (e.g. the way in which the IRO report translated to a small budget within 
the NOW program, and the inclusion of OWP in the top sector energy). This provides an 
important barrier for case studies such as ours, as much of this work occurs ‘behind closed 
doors’ 
2. We expected to find policies that were not specifically designed for shielding or nurturing 
OWP but that were strategically mobilized for these purposes by advocates, as was the case 
in the development of solar PV [23],[26]. Surprisingly, we found no significant evidence of 
‘generic’ extant policy being mobilized in this way. We did however find instances of policies 
that were intended to enable OWP (e.g. MEP, or the first-come-first-served licensing 
procedure) but that backfired due to design flaws and unforeseen interest (and that were 
therefore quickly withdrawn). This resulted in an inconsistent support trajectory that 
several interviewees have characterized as having done more harm to the development of 
OWP than the absence of support mechanisms would have. In other instances, new (or 
redesigned) policy specifically intended to constrain OWP rollout: this typically occurred 
when new, more conservative, cabinets came in power who favored realizing emissions 
targets in the cheapest possible way. It is known that in the case of solar PV, proponents 
develop their technology further in different (building-integrated, decentralized, off-grid) 
application domains in absence of dedicated policy support [23],[26]. But OWP’s capital-
intensive socio-technical configuration largely precluded this option. One possible exception 
is the recent move by the Dutch OWP sector towards focusing on supportive innovations for 
future deepwater OWP farms, which could be framed as a move to a new space in the 
absence of support for deployment. 
3. We found a general discrepancy between the goals and effects of policy, which is most clear 
in empowering processes. For example, we interpret the emergence of consecutive 
environmental policy programs (NMP 1 through 4) as the institutionalization of sustainable 
values and, as such, attempts at empowering of alternative energy options in general. 
Nevertheless, insofar as this had any significant empowering effects for sustainable energy 
at all, they certainly had none specifically for OWP. Only with the arrival of the MEP 
production subsidy that aimed to level the playing field did signs of empowering effects (in 
addition to intentions) on OWP emerge. Yet these failed to result in a break-through of OWP 
as the policy was frequently altered and eventually withdrawn, to be replaced recently with 
a more fit-and-conform empowering policy aimed at rendering OWP competitive under 
mainstream conditions (i.e. stimulating innovation aimed at cost reduction before 
supporting roll-out). 
4. We found that policies have had constraining and enabling effects on multiple (shielding, 
nurturing, empowering) processes at once: in several instances, we see that one and the 
same policy has shielding effects (e.g. NOW-1 and NOW-2 providing funds for exploring the 
idea of offshore wind, or TWIN providing funds that are used for the Lely experiment) as 
well as nurturing effects (e.g. NOW-1 and NOW-2 coalescing a network of researchers, or 
TWIN articulating goals for OWP). Shielding, nurturing and empowering are therefor not 
necessarily consecutive processes (i.e. first creating a space, then filling it with experiments, 
which then ‘break through’), as was previously implied by Smith and Raven [25]. 
Although the framework has proved generally useful for the purpose of analyzing the role that 
policy has played in shielding, nurturing and empowering Dutch offshore wind over the past 
four decades, we acknowledge that it cannot claim to fully explain this policy’s ‘erratic’ course 
itself – a characterization that is often invoked as an explanation for the relatively poor Dutch 
performance in terms of renewable energy (e.g. interviewee 3,4,6,9). Although our account 
empirically illustrates the impacts of this erratic policy course on a specific innovation, 
landscape-level policy shifts (such as the privatization and liberalization of the energy market, 
or the replacement of a transition-oriented policy to a top sector policy) currently remain 
exogenous to our account. Internalizing these thus becomes an important challenge for future 
research. 
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